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Abstract
This paper provides an innovative axiomatic analysis of the notion
of exploitation as the unequal exchange of labour. General convex
economies with heterogeneous agents endowed with unequal amounts
of physical and human capital are considered. An axiomatic character-
isation of the class of deﬁnitions that satisfy a weak domain condition
and the proﬁt-exploitation correspondence principle (PECP) is de-
rived. It is shown that none of the main received deﬁnitions preserves
the PECP. Instead, a novel deﬁnition is presented which satisﬁes the
PECP and allows one to generalise a number of key insights of ex-
ploitation theory to complex advanced economies.
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21 Introduction
What is exploitation? In political philosophy, the most general deﬁnition
aﬃrms that agent A exploits agent B if and only if A takes unfair advantage
of B. Despite its intuitive appeal, this deﬁnition leaves two major issues
in need of a precise speciﬁcation, namely the kind of unfairness involved
and the structure of the relationship between A and B that allows A to
take advantage of B. There is considerable debate in the economic and
philosophical literature concerning both issues. Although both aspects of
exploitative relations are arguably crucial (Yoshihara and Veneziani, 2009),
the analytical focus of this paper is on the unfairness, or more precisely, on
the economic inequalities involved in the concept of exploitation.
To be speciﬁc, this paper analyses the theory of exploitation as an unequal
exchange (hereafter, UE) of labour, according to which exploitative relations
are characterised by systematic diﬀerences between the amount of labour
that individuals contribute to the economy and the amount of labour they
receive, in the form of labour contained in some relevant bundle that they do
(or can) purchase with their income. There are at least two reasons to focus
on labour as the measure of the injustice of exploitative relations. First,
in a number of crucial economic interactions, the notion of exploitation is
inextricably linked with some form of labour exchange (Veneziani, 2008).
Second, the UE deﬁnition of exploitation captures some inequalities in the
distribution of material well-being and free hours that are - at least prima
facie - of normative relevance. For instance, they are relevant for inequalities
of well-being freedom, as discussed by Rawls (1971) and Sen (1985, 1985a),1
because material well-being and free hours are two crucial determinants of
individual well-being freedom. Further, it can be proved that in a private-
ownership economy with positive proﬁts, class and UE exploitation status are
strictly related, and they accurately reﬂect an unequal distribution of assets
1The notion of well-being freedom emphasises an individual’s ability to pursue the life
she values. In the Rawls-Sen theory, inequalities in the distribution of well-being freedom
are formulated as inequalities of capabilities, whereas they are formulated as inequalities of
(comprehensive) resources in Dworkin’s theory (Dworkin, 2000). The resource allocation
problem in terms of equality of capability is analysed in Gotoh and Yoshihara (2003),
whereas Roemer (1986) and Yoshihara (2003) analyse it in terms of equality of resources.
3(Roemer, 1982; Yoshihara and Veneziani, 2009). That is, in equilibrium the
wealthy emerge as exploiters and members of the capitalist class, whereas the
poor are exploited and members of the working class. From this perspective,
exploitative relations are relevant because they reﬂect unequal opportunities
of life options, due to diﬀerential ownerhsip of productive assets.
Although the deﬁnition of UE exploitation is seemingly intuitive, it has
proved surprisingly diﬃcult to provide a fully satisfactory general theory of
exploitation. In fact, outside of standard Leontief economies, the appropriate
deﬁnition of the amount of labour ‘received’ by an agent is not obvious, and
indeed a number of approaches have been proposed (see Yoshihara, 2010).
Further, outside of stylised, linear two-class economies, the core insights of
exploitation theory do not necessarily hold (Yoshihara and Veneziani, 2011a).
In this paper, exploitation is analysed in general economies with a convex
production technology and with maximising agents endowed with heteroge-
neous preferences and with diﬀerent amounts of both physical and human
capital, as outlined in section 2. These economies are signiﬁcantly more
general than those usually considered in exploitation theory.2 One substan-
tive contribution of the paper is to provide a novel deﬁnition of exploitation,
which extends the core insights of exploitation theory and allows one to char-
acterise the exploitation status of all agents in such general economies. This
deﬁnition focuses on aggregate social labour performed and on its distribu-
tion to agents via market mechanisms, and it is conceptually related to the
‘New Interpretation’ (Duménil, 1980; Foley, 1982; Duménil and Foley, 2008;
Duménil, Foley, and Lévy, 2009). According to this deﬁnition, an agent is
exploited if and only if the amount of labour she contributes is greater than
the share of social labour that she receives via her income.
This deﬁnition has a number of desirable features. It deﬁnes exploitation
as a feature of the (competitive) allocation of social labour rather than as
the result of productive ineﬃciencies, or imperfections in the labour mar-
ket. Unlike the main received approaches, it has a clear empirical content,
for it is ﬁrmly anchored to the actual data of the economy. Perhaps more
importantly, it clearly captures the inequalities arising from exploitative re-
lations, as it identiﬁes exploitation as a social relation between individuals:
in equilibrium there are some exploited agents if and only if there are some
exploiters. As shown in Yoshihara and Veneziani (2009), none of the main
2An interesting analysis of nonconvexities in Marxian economic theory can be found in
Negishi (1998). The latter paper does not focus on exploitation, though.
4deﬁnitions in the literature satisfy this fundamental relational property in
general.
Methodologically, this paper provides a new axiomatic analysis of UE ex-
ploitation and a general characterisation of the class of deﬁnitions satisfying
two key axioms.3 An axiomatic approach was long overdue in exploitation
theory, where the proposal of alternative deﬁnitions has sometimes appeared
as a painful process of adjustment of the theory to anomalies and coun-
terexamples. The deﬁnitions of exploitation thus constructed have progres-
sively lost the intuitive appeal, normative relevance, and even connection
with the actual, observed variables emerging from a competitive mechanism.
By adopting an axiomatic approach, this paper suggests to start from ﬁrst
principles, thus explicitly discussing the intuitions behind UE exploitation.
To be precise, in section 3, two axioms are analysed. The ﬁrst is called
Labour Exploitation for the Working Class (hereafter, LEW), and it restricts
the way in which the set of exploited agents is identiﬁed. This axiom is in-
terpreted as a minimal necessary condition to capture the core intuitions
of exploitation theory, and it is shown that indeed all of the main deﬁni-
tions of exploitation in the literature satisfy it (see Morishima, 1974; Foley,
1982; Roemer, 1982. See also Yoshihara and Veneziani, 2009; and Yoshihara,
2010). The second axiom is the Proﬁt-Exploitation Correspondence Principle
(hereafter, PECP), and it incorporates the intuition that proﬁts are one of
the key determinants of the existence of exploitation, and of inequalities in
well-being freedom: proﬁts represent the way in which capitalists appropriate
social surplus and social labour. Formally, PECP states that, in equilibrium,
propertyless agents are exploited if and only if proﬁts are positive. Theorem
1 provides the ﬁrst rigorous characterisation of the class of deﬁnitions satis-
fying LEW which meet PECP. Based on this characterisation, it is shown
that, among all the main deﬁnitions, the ‘New Interpretation’ is the only one
that preserves PECP.
Theorem 1 provides some interesting and innovative insights, as compared
to existing contributions investigating the relation between exploitation and
proﬁts, such as the literature on the so-called Fundamental Marxian Theorem
(hereafter, FMT; see Morishima, 1974; Roemer, 1980; Krause, 1982; Mor-
ishima, 1989; Veneziani, 2004; Mori, 2008; Flaschel, 1983, 2010; Fujimoto
and Opocher, 2010). Methodologically, the epistemological status of PECP
as a postulate is explicitly acknowledged and Theorem 1 provides the ﬁrst
3For a related approach see Yoshihara and Veneziani (2009) and Yoshihara (2010).
5general axiomatic analysis of the relation between exploitation and proﬁts,
and a starting point for further research in general convex economies with
heterogeneous agents.
Substantively, in the literature on the FMT, the existence of exploitation
is proved to be synonymous with positive proﬁts in an arguably small set
of linear, two-class economies. Yet a number of counterexamples have been
found in more general models and no fully satisfactory deﬁnition of exploita-
tion that preserves the FMT has been provided so far. Theorem 1 proves that
if the ‘New Interpretation’ is adopted, then a robust correspondence between
exploitation and proﬁts can be established in general convex economies with
heterogeneous agents. In this sense, Theorem 1 is signiﬁcantly more general
than analogous results on the FMT. However, Theorem 1 is theoretically
diﬀerent from, and arguably more interesting than, standard FMT results:
ﬁrst, as argued below, axiom PECP is logically diﬀerent from the standard
FMT. Second, in the standard Okishio-Morishima approach, the existence
of (aggregate) labour exploitation is just a numerical representation of the
existence of surplus products in a productive economy. Thus, the FMT es-
tablishes the equivalence between positive proﬁts and the productiveness of
the economy measured in terms of the labour numéraire. However, analo-
gous results can be proved when productiveness is measured in terms of any
other good (this is the so-called Generalised Commodity Exploitation Theo-
rem; Roemer, 1982), which raises doubts on the signiﬁcance of the FMT for
exploitation theory. If the ‘New Interpretation’ is adopted, instead, positive
proﬁts are necessary and suﬃcient for the existence of exploitative relations,
but this holds only if labour exploitation is considered: no equivalent result
holds if any other commodity is used to deﬁne exploitation.
Given the theoretical relevance of PECP in exploitation theory, however,
the main implication of Theorem 1 is to provide strong support for the ‘New
Interpretation’ as the appropriate formulation of UE exploitation. Thus, it
conﬁrms and extends the analysis of Yoshihara and Veneziani (2009), who
have shown that in the class of convex subsistence economies - which may
be taken as a subset of the economies analysed in this paper - the ‘New
Interpretation’ is uniquely characterised by a small number of weak axioms
capturing the key insights of UE exploitation.
Two extensions of the analysis are also presented, which provide further
support for the ‘New Interpretation.’ First, a focus on the poorest segment
of the working class, namely agents without any physical assets, is appro-
priate from the axiomatic viewpoint: focusing on a strict subset of the set
6of agents makes the axiomatic framework rather weak. Yet one may argue
that this is reductive and some key characteristics of advanced capitalist
economies should be explicitly considered, which make the issue of Marxist
exploitation a contentious one today - such as the fact that many workers
own some non-labour assets, and even stock in ﬁrms, through their pension
funds. Second, although exploitation is traditionally analysed by focusing
on equilibrium allocations (see Morishima, 1974; Roemer, 1980), one may
question general equilibrium-type constructions as representations of alloca-
tion and distribution in market economies because they depend on the often
tacit assumption of equal-treatment.4 In a general theory of exploitation, it
would be important to take account of transactions at disequilibrium prices
and the resulting inequity in distribution endogenous to market allocation.
In section 4, the generality of the model is exploited to show that the ‘New
Interpretation’ can be extended, ﬁrst, to analyse the exploitation status of
all agents, in economies with heterogeneous preferences, physical assets, and
skills (Theorem 2), and then to establish a relation between exploitation and
proﬁts outside of equilibrium allocations (Theorem 3).
These results are encouraging, as they show that the ‘New Interpreta-
tion’ has a number of desirable properties in rather general economies and,
among other things, it captures the relation between proﬁts and exploitative
relations. Indeed, the ‘New Interpretation’ seems to provide the foundations
for a general theoretical framework, which can deal with many unresolved
issues in exploitation theory, including the analysis of unequal exchange and
international relations. (See Veneziani and Yoshihara, 2009. For a critique
of the standard Marxist analysis, see Negishi, 1999.) Some extensions of the
analysis are brieﬂy discussed in the concluding section 5 below.
Finally, the existence of a general equilibrium is proved in Appendix 1.
This proof completes the analysis by showing the consistency of the eco-
nomic framework, but it is also interesting per se because both the structure
of Marxian economies and the equilibrium concept adopted are diﬀerent from
the standard Walrasian framework. Indeed, Appendix 1 generalises the ex-
istence results derived by Roemer (1980).
4This issue has been brought to our attention by Duncan Foley in a private exchange.
For an analysis of the implications of trading at disequilibrium prices, see Foley (2010).
72 The Model
An economy consists of N agents. Let R+ be the set of nonnegative real
numbers. Production technology is freely available to all agents, who can
operate any activity in the production set P, which has elements of the form
α =( −αl,−α,α) where αl ∈ R+ is the eﬀective labour input of the process;
α ∈ Rn
+ are the inputs of the produced goods used in the process; and
α ∈ Rn
+ are the outputs of the n goods. Thus, elements of P are vectors in
R2n+1. The net output vector arising from α is denoted as b α ≡ α − α. P
is assumed to be a closed convex cone containing the origin in R2n+1.L e t
the vector with all components equal to zero be denoted as 0. The following
assumptions on P hold throughout the paper.5
Assumption 1 (A1). For all α ∈ P,i fα ≥ 0 then αl > 0.
Assumption 2 (A2). For all c ∈ Rn
+ ,t h e r ei saα ∈ P such that b α = c.
Assumption 3 (A3). For all α ∈ P,a n df o ra l l(−α0,α0) ∈ Rn
− × Rn
+ ,i f
(−α0,α0) 5 (−α,α) then (−αl,−α0,α0) ∈ P.
A1 implies that labour is indispensable to produce any non-negative output
vector. A2 states that any non-negative commodity vector is producible as
an e to u t p u t .A3 is a standard free disposal condition.
Given P, the set of production activities feasible with αl = k units of
eﬀective labour can be deﬁned as follows:
P (αl = k) ≡ {(−αl,−α,α) ∈ P | αl = k},
and the set of net output vectors feasible with k units of eﬀective labour is:
b P (αl = k) ≡ {b α ∈ R
n | there is α ∈ P (αl = k) such that α − α = b α}.
For any set X ⊆ Rn, ∂X ≡ {x ∈ X | @x0 ∈ X s.t. x0 >x } is the frontier of
X,a n dSX ≡ {x ∈ X | @x0 ∈ X s.t. x0 ≥ x} is the eﬃcient frontier of X.
This paper investigates exploitation when heterogeneous agents are en-
dowed with unequal amounts of physical and human capital. In the economy,
agents produce, consume, and trade labour. On the production side, they
5For all vectors x, y ∈ Rn, x = y if and only if xi = yi (i =1 ,...,n); x ≥ y if and only
if x = y and x 6= y; x>yif and only if xi >y i (i =1 ,...,n).
8can either sell their labour-power or hire workers to work on their capital,
or they can be self-employed and work on their own assets. More precisely,
for all ν ∈ N,l e tsν ∈ R++ be agent ν’s skill level and let ων ∈ Rn
+ be the
vector of productive assets inherited by ν. Then, αν =( −αν
l ,−αν,αν) ∈ P
is the production process operated by ν as a self-employed producer, with
her own capital, where αν
l = sνaν
l and aν







∈ P is the production process that ν operates by hir-
ing (eﬀective) labour βν
l ; γν = sνlν is ν’s eﬀective labour supply, where lν is
the labour time supplied by ν on the market. Thus, let λν =( aν
l + lν) be the
total amount of labour time expended by ν,a n dl e tΛν = αν
l +γν = sνλν be
the total amount of eﬀective labour performed by ν, either as a self-employed
producer or working for some other agent.
On the consumption side, let C ⊆ Rn
+ be the consumption space of each
agent with generic element cν as a consumption vector of agent ν, and assume
that total labour hours expended by each agent do not exceed the common
endowment Lν, where units are normalised so that Lν =1 ,f o ra l lν.A g e n t
ν’ sw e l f a r ei sr e p r e s e n t a b l eb yaf u n c t i o nuν : C × [0,1] → R+ ,w h i c hi s
monotonic on C ×[0,1] (increasing in consumption and decreasing in labour
time). The function u can be interpreted either as a standard subjectivist
neoclassical utility function or as an objectivist index of individual well-
being, or status. The latter view is more in line with exploitation theory, but
the two interpretations are formally equivalent.6 For the sake of simplicity,
and with no loss of generality, in what follows, u is assumed to be strictly
monotonic on C in at least one argument. The conclusions of the paper do
not depend on this assumption, and some extensions of the analysis and the
relation with other models in the literature are discussed in section 5 below.
Let p denote the 1 × n vector of commodity prices and let w denote the
wage rate per unit of eﬀective labour. Given the assumption of perfect con-
tracting in the labour market, the latter is indeed the relevant wage. Given
(p,w),e a c hν is assumed to choose a plan (αν,βν,γν,c ν) to maximise her
welfare subject to the constraint that net income is suﬃcient for consump-
tion plans; wealth is suﬃcient for production plans; production plans are
technically feasible; and total labour hours expended do not exceed Lν =1 .
6For a discussion of subjective and objective approaches, see Roemer and Veneziani
(2004) and, in the context of exploitation theory, Veneziani and Yoshihara (2009).


































ν ∈ P; β
ν ∈ P, λ
ν 5 1.
MPν is a rather standard way of modelling agent ν’s decision problem in
microeconomic theory, and thus no detailed discussion is necessary. It is
worth noting, however, that MPν explicitly incorporates the simultaneous
role of economic actors as consumers and producers, so that no separate
consideration of ﬁrms is necessary. In this respect, MPν can be interpreted as
a generalisation of standard Marxian accumulation economies with identical
agents (e.g., Roemer 1980, 1982; Yoshihara, 2010). In Yoshihara (2010),
for example, s =( 1 ,...,1), C ≡ Rn
+ , and there is a continuous, quasi-
concave, and strictly monotonic real-valued function f : C → R+ such
that uν(c,λ)=f (c),f o ra l lν and for any (c,λ) ∈ C × [0,1].F u r t h e r , a s
shown below, although agents are not assumed to maximise proﬁts, proﬁt
maximisation is a corollary of MPν. Yet in this model individuals are not
assumed to be simply ‘agents of capital’ and unlike in traditional Marxian
economies (e.g., Roemer, 1982, ch.4), capitalists are not assumed to maximise
accumulation per se, or to produce for production’s own sake.
Let Oν (p,w) be the set of plans (αν,βν,γν,c ν) that solve MPν at prices










Let E(P,N,u,s,Ω), or as a shorthand notation E, denote the economy with
technology P,a g e n t sN, utility functions u, labour skills s, and productive
endowments Ω. Let the set of all such economies be denoted by E.L e t
c =
PN
ν=1 cν be aggregate consumption; and let a similar notation hold for
all other variables. The equilibrium concept can now be deﬁned.
Deﬁnition 1: A reproducible solution (RS) for E(P,N,u,s,Ω) ∈ E is a price
vector (p,w) and an associated set of actions such that:
7The ﬁrst constraint is written as equality without loss of generality, given the assump-
tions on the monotonicity of u.
10(i) (αν,βν,γν,c ν) ∈ Oν (p,w) for all ν (optimality);
(ii) b α + b β = c (reproducibility);
(iii) α + β 5 ω (feasibility);
(iv) βl = γ (labour market equilibrium).
In other words, at a RS (i) every agent optimises; (iii) there are enough
resources for production plans; and (iv) the labour market clears. Condition
(ii) states that net outputs should at least suﬃce for aggregate consumption.
This is equivalent to requiring that the vector of social endowments does not
decrease component-wise, because (ii) is equivalent to ω +
³
b α + b β − c
´
= ω,
w h i c hs t a t e st h a ts t o c k sa tt h eb e g i n n i n go fn e x tp e r i o ds h o u l dn o tb es m a l l e r
than stocks at the beginning of the current period. Indeed, although the RS is
deﬁned as a temporary equilibrium in a static general equilibrium framework,
it can be seen as a one-shot slice of a stationary equilibrium in a dynamic
general equilibrium framework.8
Some properties of RSs should be noted. First, by the assumptions on
u, it immediately follows that p ∈ Rn
+ \{0} and w = 0 at a non-trivial RS.
Next, let πmax =m a x α∈P
pb α−wαl
pα : by the assumptions on P, πmax is well-
deﬁned. Hence, let Pπ(p,w)=
n




. I ti sp r o v e ni na
straightforward way that, at any non-trivial RS, the maximum proﬁtr a t e
is nonnegative; and only processes yielding the maximum rate of proﬁta r e
activated.
Lemma 1: Let (p,w) be a non-trivial RS for E ∈ E such that c ≥ 0. Then,
pb α − wαl = 0 for some α ∈ P\{0},a n dαν,βν ∈ Pπ(p,w) for all ν.
3 Labour exploitation: an axiomatic approach
In the UE approach, exploitation is conceived of as the unequal exchange of
labour between agents: considering an agent ν ∈ N, exploitative relations are
characterised by systematic diﬀerences between the labour contributed by ν
to the economy and the labour ‘received’ by ν, which is given by the amount
of labour contained, or embodied, in some relevant consumption bundle(s).
Therefore, for any bundle c ∈ Rn
+, it is necessary to deﬁne the labour value (or
labour content) of c. Unlike in standard Leontief economies, the deﬁnition
8See Veneziani (2007) and Veneziani and Yoshihara (2009) for a thorough analysis.
11of the labour content of c is not obvious, and various deﬁnitions have, in
fact, been proposed. In this section, a general condition - called the axiom
of Labour Exploitation for the Working Class, or LEW -i sp r o p o s e dw h i c h
every deﬁnition of labour exploitation should satisfy in order to capture the
core insights of the theory of exploitation as the UE of labour.
Let W ≡ {ν ∈ N | ων = 0}: W is the set of agents with no initial en-
dowments. The economies analysed in this paper are more general than the
polarised, two-class societies usually considered in the literature, and in the
next section the exploitation status of all agents is derived, including those
in intermediate class positions. Yet the set W - which can be interpreted
as the core of the working class - is of clear focal interest in exploitation
theory: theoretically, if any agents are exploited, then those in W should be
deﬁnitely among them, if they work at all. It is therefore opportune, from
an axiomatic viewpoint, to focus on the set W i no r d e rt op r o v i d ead o m a i n
condition deﬁning a minimum requirement that all deﬁnitions of exploitation
as the UE of labour should satisfy.9
Let B (p,wΛ) ≡
©
c ∈ Rn
+ | pc = wΛ
ª
denote the set of consumption bun-
dles that can be (just) aﬀorded, at prices p,b ya na g e n ti nW, who supplies
Λ u n i t so fl a b o u ra taw a g er a t ew.L e tφ(c) ≡ {α ∈ P | b α = c} denote the
s e to fa c t i v i t i e st h a tp r o d u c ea tl e a s tc as net output. A basic axiom can now
be introduced that every formulation of labour exploitation should satisfy.
Labour Exploitation for the Working Class (LEW): Consider any
economy E ∈ E. Let (p,w) be a RS for E. Given any deﬁnition of exploita-
tion, the set of exploited agents Nted ⊆ N is identiﬁed at (p,w). The set
Nted should have the following property: there exists a proﬁle (c1,...,c|W|)









Axiom LEW requires that, at any RS, the exploitation status of every
propertyless worker ν ∈ W be characterised by identifying a nonnegative
9It might be argued that the appropriate deﬁnition of proletarians relates to their
ﬁnancial wealth, rather than their vector of endowments. If this view is adopted, then
W0 = {ν ∈ N | pων =0 }. This distinction is relevant only if p ≯ 0 and it does not make
any signiﬁcant diﬀerence for the results of this paper. In fact, since axiom LEW aims to
provide a weak domain condition to deﬁne the set of exploited agents, it is theoretically
appropriate to focus on the set of agents W ⊆ W0.
12reference commodity vector cν. This reference vector is technically feasible
and can be purchased by ν,a n di ti d e n t i ﬁes the amount of labour that ν
receives. Thus, if ν ∈ W supplies Λν,a n dΛν is more than the labour
socially necessary to produce cν,t h e nν is regarded as contributing more
labour than ν receives. According to LEW, all such agents belong to Nted.10
As a domain condition for the admissible class of exploitation-forms,
LEW captures some key insights of the UE theory of exploitation that are
shared by all of the main approaches in the literature.11 In the UE theory,
the exploitation status of an agent ν is determined by the diﬀerence between
t h ea m o u n to fl a b o u rt h a tν ‘contributes’ to the economy, in some relevant
sense, and the amount she ‘receives’, in some relevant sense. In the con-
vex economies considered in this paper, the former quantity is given by the
amount of labour supplied, Λν, whereas there are many possible UE views
concerning the amount of labour that each agent receives, which incorporate
diﬀerent normative and positive concerns. As a domain condition, LEW
provides some minimal, key restrictions on the deﬁnition of the amount of
labour that a theoretically relevant subset of agents receives.
First, according to LEW, the amount of labour that ν ∈ W receives
depends on her income, or more precisely, it is determined in equilibrium by
some reference consumption vectors that ν can purchase. In the standard
approaches, the reference vector corresponds to the bundle actually chosen
by the agent. LEW is weaker in that it only requires that the reference
vector be potentially aﬀordable.
Second, LEW captures another key tenet of the UE theory of exploitation
by stipulating that the amount of labour associated with the reference bundle
- and thus ‘received’ by an agent - is related to the production conditions
of the economy. More precisely, LEW states that the reference bundle be
technologically feasible as net output, and it deﬁnes its labour content as the
amount of labour socially necessary to produce it. It is worth noting that
LEW requires that the amount of labour associated with each reference
bundle be uniquely determined with reference to production conditions, but
10In axiom LEW the case Nted = N is not ruled out: this is theoretically appropriate,
given the nature of LEW as a minimum domain condition, for even some of the classic
deﬁnitions of exploitation - such as Morishima’s (1974) - do not exclude this case.
11It should be stressed that LEW only applies to labour-based deﬁnitions of exploita-
tion. It is not relevant, for example, for Roemer’s (1982) property-relations deﬁnition of
exploitation. Similar versions of LEW are analysed by Yoshihara and Veneziani (2009)
and Yoshihara (2010), in the context of diﬀerent economies.
13it does not specify how such amount should be chosen, and there may be in
principle many (eﬃcient) ways of producing cν, and thus of determining αcν
l .
Third, LEW is weak also because it does not provide comprehensive
conditions for the determination of exploitation status. As already noted, it
only focuses on a subset of agents, namely those who own no physical assets,
and it is silent on the exploitation status of all other agents. Further, given
any deﬁnition of exploitation, and any RS, the set of exploiters Nter ⊆ N is
also deﬁned, where Nter∩Nted = ∅,b u ta x i o mLEW imposes no restrictions
on the determination of Nter.
Finally, it is worth noting that the vector cν in LEW need not be uniquely
ﬁx e d ,a n dm a yb eaf u n c t i o no f(p,w). Further, once cν is identiﬁed, the
existence of αcν is guaranteed by A2 and A3.
In sum, LEW incorporates several key features of exploitation as the UE
of labour, and it sets a weak restriction on the class of admissible deﬁnitions.
Indeed, all of the main deﬁnitions in the literature, suitably extended to
economies with heterogeneous labour, satisfy LEW.C o n s i d e rﬁrst Morishi-
ma’s (1974) classic deﬁnition. According to Morishima, the labour embodied
in a commodity vector c, denoted as l.v.(c), is the minimum amount of (ef-
fective) labour necessary to produce c as net output. Formally:
l.v.(c) ≡ min{αl | α =( −αl,−α,α) ∈ φ(c)}.
It is easy to see that φ(c) is non-empty by A2 and that the set
{αl | α =( −αl;−α;α) ∈ φ(c)}
is bounded from below by 0, by the assumption 0 ∈ P and by A1. Hence,
l.v.(c) is well-deﬁned and, by A1, it is positive whenever c 6= 0.T h e n :
Deﬁnition 2 (Morishima, 1974): Aw o r k e rν ∈ W, who supplies Λν and
consumes cν ∈ Rn
+ ,i sexploited, i.e. ν ∈ Nted, if and only if Λν >l . v .(cν).
Deﬁnition 2 satisﬁes LEW:a ta n yR S ,l e tcν ≡ cν ∈ B (p,wΛν) and
α
cν
∈ argmin{αl | α =( −αl,−α,α) ∈ φ(c
ν)}.
Unlike Morishima’s (1974) deﬁnition, Roemer’s (1982) deﬁnition of labour
value depends on prices. Given a price vector (p,w),l e tφ(c;p,w) ≡ {α ∈ Pπ(p,w) | b α = c}
be the set of proﬁt-rate-maximising activities that produce at least c as net
output. According to Roemer (1982), the labour value of vector c, denoted
14as l.v.(c;p,w), is the minimum amount of (eﬀective) labour necessary to
produce c as net output among proﬁt-rate-maximising activities. Formally:
l.v.(c;p,w) ≡ min{αl | α =( −αl,−α,α) ∈ φ(c;p,w)}.
Again, l.v.(c;p,w) is well deﬁned and it is positive for all c 6= 0. Then:
Deﬁnition 3 (Roemer, 1982): Consider an economy E ∈ E.L e t(p,w) be a
RS for E.Aw o r k e rν ∈ W, who supplies Λν and consumes cν,i sexploited,
i.e. ν ∈ Nted, if and only if Λν >l . v .(cν;p,w).
Deﬁn i t i o n3a l s os a t i s ﬁes LEW:a ta n yR S ,l e tcν ≡ cν ∈ B (p,wΛν) and
α
cν
∈ argmin{αl | α =( −αl,−α,α) ∈ φ(c
ν;p,w)}.
In addition to the above two classic deﬁnitions, in this paper, a new
deﬁnition is analysed, which has been recently proposed by Yoshihara and
Veneziani (2009, 2011) and Yoshihara (2010). For any p ∈ Rn





+ | px = pc
ª
: B(p,c) is the set of bundles that cost
exactly as much as c at prices p.
Deﬁnition 4: Consider an economy E ∈ E.L e t(p,w) be a RS for E such
that b α
p,w is aggregate net output and α
p,w
l is aggregate (eﬀective) labour
expended. For each c ∈ Rn
+ with pc 5 pb α
p,w,l e tτc ∈ [0,1] be such that
τcb α




As in Roemer’s (1982) approach, in Deﬁnition 4 the labour content of a
bundle can be identiﬁed only if the price vector is known. Yet social relations
play a more central role than in Roemer’s theory, because the deﬁnition of
labour content requires a prior knowledge of the social reproduction point
and labour content is explicitly linked to the redistribution of total social
labour (total labour employed), which corresponds to the total labour con-
tent of national income. Then, the following deﬁnition identiﬁes the set of
propertyless workers who are exploited.
Deﬁnition 5: Consider an economy E ∈ E.L e t(p,w) be a RS for E such
that b α
p,w is the social reproduction point. For any ν ∈ W, who supplies
Λν and consumes cν,l e tτcν be deﬁn e da si nD e ﬁnition 4. Then, ν ∈ W is
exploited, i.e. ν ∈ Nted, if and only if Λν > τcνα
p,w
l .
15Deﬁnition 5 is conceptually related to the ‘New Interpretation’ developed by
Duménil (1980) and Foley (1982). In fact, for any ν ∈ W, τcν represents ν’s
share of national income, and so τcνα
p,w
l represents the share of social labour
which ν receives by earning income barely suﬃcient to buy pcν. Then, as in
the New Interpretation, the notion of exploitation is related to the production
and distribution of national income and social labour.
In order to show that Deﬁnition 5 satisﬁes LEW,g i v e na n y(p,w) such
that αp,w is the social production point, let τcν =
pcν
pb αp,w, cν ≡ τcν · b α
p,w ∈
B (p,wΛν) and αcν ≡ τcναp,w.
The previous arguments provide strong support to the idea that LEW
does represent an appropriate domain condition in exploitation theory. LEW
is formally weak and it incorporates some arguably compelling and widely
shared views on exploitation as the UE of labour. Thus, although it can be
proved that the axiom is not trivial and not all deﬁnitions in the literature
satisfy it,12 all of the major approaches do.13 The next question, then, is how
to discriminate among the various deﬁnitions satisfying LEW.
A key tenet of UE exploitation theory is the idea that proﬁts are one of
the key determinants of the existence of exploitation, and of inequalities in
well-being freedom: proﬁts represent the way in which capitalists appropriate
social surplus and social labour. Therefore there should exist in general a
correspondence between the exploitation of at least the poorest segments
of the working class and positive proﬁts. The next axiom formalises this
intuition.
Proﬁt-Exploitation Correspondence Principle (PECP): Given an econ-









whenever W+ ≡ {ν ∈ W | Λν > 0} 6= ∅.
A number of points are worth noting about PECP. First, the axiom is
formulated without specifying any deﬁnition of exploitation: whatever the
12For example, it can be proved that the subjectivist notion of labour exploitation based
on workers’ preferences recently proposed by Matsuo (2008) does not satisfy LEW.F o ra
thorough discussion, see Yoshihara and Veneziani (2011).
13It is worth noting that based on Flaschel’s (1983) deﬁnition of additive labor values,i ti s
possible to derive another formulation of labor exploitation that satisﬁes LEW. Similarly,
Deﬁnition 6 in Yoshihara (2010) also satisﬁes LEW.
16deﬁnition adopted, propertyless agents should be exploited if and only if
proﬁts are positive in equilibrium. Second, PECP is more general than in
standard two-class models. This is because it both applies to advanced capi-
talist economies with a complex class structure, and allows for the possibility
that propertyless workers in W+ are a strict subset of the set of exploited
agents, that is W+ ⊂ Nted. Note that the axiom focuses only on propertyless
workers who perform at least some labour: this is a theoretically appropri-
a t er e s t r i c t i o n ,s i n c et h ee x p l o i t a t i o ns t a t u so fa g e n t sw h od on o te n g a g ei n
any economic activities is unclear. Third, unlike in standard models, PECP
is general also in the sense that it allows for very general assumptions on
agents and technology, including heterogeneous preferences and skills, a con-
vex cone technology, and so on. Finally, unlike in the standard literature,
PECP explicitly focuses on the exploitation status of a speciﬁc set of agents,
rather than on the aggregate rate of exploitation in the economy. Indeed, the
axiom imposes no constraints on the deﬁnition of exploitation at RS’s with
W+ = ∅.
Let B++ (p,wΛ) ≡
©
c ∈ Rn
+ | pc > wΛ
ª
: B++ (p,wΛ) is the set of con-
sumption bundles that an agent in W supplying Λ units of eﬀective labour
cannot aﬀord. Let Γ(p,w;k) ≡
n
b α ∈ ∂ b P (αl = k) ∩ Rn
+ | b α ∈ B++ (p,wk)
o
:
Γ(p,w;k) is the set of net outputs that can be produced eﬃciently using k
units of (eﬀective) labour, which cannot be aﬀorded by propertyless agents
supplying k units of eﬀective labour. The next theorem characterises the class
of deﬁnitions of exploitation that satisfy LEW a n ds u c ht h a tPECP holds.
Recall that if LEW holds, then for any ν ∈ W,t h e r ei sacν ∈ B (p,wΛν)
and αcν ∈ φ(cν) ∩ ∂P with b α
cν
≯ cν such that
£
ν ∈ Nted ⇔ αcν
l < Λν¤
.
Theorem 1: For any deﬁnition of labour exploitation satisfying LEW, the
following two statements are equivalent for any E ∈ E and for any RS (p,w)
with associated aggregate production activity αp,w:
(1) PECP holds under this deﬁnition;
(2) for each ν ∈ W+,
h








such that cν > b α
cνi
⇔ πmax > 0.
Proof: F i r s to fa l l ,n o t et h a ta ta n yE ∈ E and any RS (p,w) with αp,w
such that either W = ∅ or Λν =0for all ν ∈ W, the equivalence is immedi-
ately established, for both PECP and condition (2) are vacuously satisﬁed.
Therefore in the rest of the proof suppose that Λν > 0 for at least some
ν ∈ W,a n dW 6= ∅.
17(2)⇒(1): Consider any E ∈ E and any RS (p,w) with αp,w.S u p p o s et h a t ,
for each ν ∈ W+,
h












Let πmax > 0,s ot h a tb yL e m m a1 ,pb α
p,w − wα
p,w
l > 0.N o t e t h a t , f o r




p,w then cν ∈ ∂ b P (αl = Λν). Then, for all ν ∈ W+,
since cν ∈ ∂ b P (αl = Λν) and cν > b α
cν
, and noting that αcν ∈ φ(cν)∩∂P,w e
have αcν
l < Λν. Thus, by LEW, ν ∈ Nted holds for any ν ∈ W+.
Let πmax =0 ,s ot h a tb yL e m m a1 ,pb α
p,w − wα
p,w
l =0 .F i r s t ,n o t et h a t
by A2, πmax =0implies w>0.N e x t ,f o r e a c h ν ∈ W+,i fπmax =0 ,t h e n
∂ b P (αl = Λν) ∩ Rn
+ ⊆ B− (p,wΛν) ≡
©
c ∈ Rn
+ | pc 5 wΛνª
, which implies





p,w, cν > b α
cν




p,w and cν ∈ B (p,wΛν)
imply that for any αcν ∈ φ(cν) with b α
cν
≯ cν, αcν
l = Λν. Thus, by LEW,
ν / ∈ Nted holds for any ν ∈ W+.
In sum, (2) implies that PECP holds under any deﬁnition of exploitation
satisfying LEW.








l > 0,s ot h a tπmax > 0.B yLEW and PECP,f o re a c h
ν ∈ W+,t h e r ee x i s tcν ∈ Rn
+ and αcν ∈ φ(cν) ∩ ∂P with αcν ≯ cν such that
pcν = wΛν and αcν
l < Λν.
Suppose ﬁrst that αcν
l =0for some ν ∈ W+. Then, by A1 and LEW,t h i s
implies that b α
cν
= 0,a n dt h e r e f o r ecν = 0, which implies pcν =0and w =0 .
Then, noting Λν > 0 for all ν ∈ W+,t h es e t∂ b P (αl = Λν)∩Rn
++ is non-empty
by A2.M o r e o v e r , f o r a n y cν ∈ ∂ b P (αl = Λν) ∩ Rn
++, cν ∈ B++ (p,wΛν)
follows from p ≥ 0. Therefore, there exists cν ∈ Γ(p,w;Λν) such that




l > 0 for all ν ∈ W+. Then, for all ν ∈ W+,l e tδν > 1
be such that δναcν
l = Λν.F o r e a c h ν ∈ W+,l e tu sﬁrst consider the case
that b α
cν
> 0. Then, let cν ≡ δνb α
cν
.C l e a r l ycν ∈ Γ(p,w;Λν) and cν > b α
cν
.
Secondly, let us consider the case that b α
cν
≯ 0. N o t et h a t ,b e c a u s eo fA 2 ,
∂ b P (αl = Λν) ∩ Rn
++ 6= ∅ holds. Since δνb α
cν
∈ ∂ b P (αl = Λν) ∩ Rn
+,t h e
convexity of b P (αl = Λν) guarantees that any convex combination of δνb α
cν
and any points in ∂ b P (αl = Λν)∩Rn
++ is feasible, and any point derived from
this convex combination belongs to b P (αl = Λν)∩Rn
++, even if it is very close
to δνb α
cν
. Thus, for any open neighbourhood V of δνb α
cν
, V ∩ b P (αl = Λν) ∩
18Rn
++ 6= ∅,a n df o rs o m es u ﬃciently small neighbourhood V∗ of δνb α
cν
,t h e r ei s
xν ∈ V∗∩ b P (αl = Λν)∩Rn
++ which is suﬃciently close to δνb α
cν
and xν > b α
cν
holds. Then, there is ²ν = 1 such that ²νxν ∈ ∂ b P (αl = Λν)∩Rn
++.T a k ecν ≡
²νxν.S u p p o s ew>0.T h e nδνb α
cν
∈ B++ (p,wΛν),a n dcν ∈ B++ (p,wΛν)
follows from the fact that xν is suﬃciently close to δνb α
cν
, B++ (p,wΛν) is
open, and ²ν = 1.T h u s , cν ∈ Γ(p,w;Λν) and cν > b α
cν
. Suppose w =0 .
If pb α
cν
> 0, the result follows in a similar manner. If pb α
cν
=0 , the result
follows from the fact that cν ∈ Rn




l =0 ,s ot h a tb yL e m m a1 ,πmax =0 .B y LEW and
PECP,f o rs o m eν ∈ W+,t h e r ee x i s tcν ∈ Rn
+ and αcν ∈ φ(cν) ∩ ∂P with
αcν ≯ cν such that pcν = wΛν and αcν
l = Λν. Actually, the latter property
must hold for all ν ∈ W+. For suppose, to the contrary, that for some
ν ∈ W+,t h e r ee x i s tcν ∈ Rn
+ and αcν ∈ φ(cν) ∩ ∂P with αcν ≯ cν such that
pcν = wΛν and αcν
l < Λν. Then this implies pb α
cν
= pcν = wΛν >w αcν
l ,
which violates the assumption that πmax =0 . Thus, for any ν ∈ W+,t h e r e
exist cν ∈ Rn
+ and αcν ∈ φ(cν) ∩ ∂P with αcν ≯ cν such that pcν = wΛν
and αcν




p,w,s i n c eΓ(p,w;Λν) is
empty when πmax =0 .S i n c epcν = wΛν = pcν, it follows that cν
i ≯ b α
cν
i for
at least some i with b α
cν
i > 0.N o t et h a tb yA2, πmax =0implies that w>0.
In sum, if PECP holds, then (2) holds under any deﬁnition of exploita-
tion satisfying LEW.
Theorem 1 can be interpreted as follows. PECP states that propertyless
workers are exploited if and only if equilibrium proﬁts are positive. According
to LEW, the exploitation status of propertyless workers is determined by
identifying a set of reference bundles (call them the exploitation-reference
bundles). By Theorem 1, in every convex economy, PECP holds if and
only if the existence of positive proﬁts in equilibrium is also determined by
identifying a set of reference bundles (call them the proﬁt-reference bundles).
According to LEW, the exploitation-reference bundles must be aﬀordable
by the workers and must be producible with less than Λν units of labour for
all exploited workers. According to condition (2) of Theorem 1, instead, for
all workers ν ∈ W+, the proﬁt-reference bundles must be producible with a
technically eﬃcient process using Λν units of labour, and must be such that
they are not aﬀordable by ν and dominate the exploitation-reference vectors
if and only if the maximum proﬁtr a t ei sp o s i t i v e .T h er e l e v a n c eo fT h e o r e m
1, then, is not only in the identiﬁcation of a general condition for the validity
19of the relation between exploitation and proﬁts. Methodologically, Theorem
1 suggests that diﬀerent views about exploitation, and the analysis of the
key features of exploitation theory, should focus on the identiﬁcation of the
relevant vectors of (exploitation and proﬁt) reference bundles.
Theorem 1 does not identify a unique deﬁnition of exploitation that meets
axiom PECP, but rather a class of deﬁnitions satisfying condition (2). Yet
Theorem 1 has surprising implications concerning the main received ap-
proaches in exploitation theory. For there are economies in which for all








satisﬁes condition (2), if b α
cν
is
given either by Deﬁnition 2 or by Deﬁnition 3. In contrast, it can be proved
that Deﬁnition 5 satisﬁes condition (2), and thus PECP holds in general
convex economies with heterogeneous agents.14
Corollary 1: There exists an economy E ∈ E and a RS (p,w) with as-
sociated aggregate production point αp,w such that neither Deﬁnition 2 nor
Deﬁnition 3 satisﬁes PECP.I n s t e a d ,Deﬁnition 5 satisﬁes PECP for all
E ∈ E and all RS (p,w).
Proof. For the proof that neither Deﬁnitions 2 nor 3 satisﬁes PECP, see
A p p e n d i x2 . W en e e dt op r o v et h a tD e ﬁnition 5 satisﬁes condition (2) of
Theorem 1. We consider two cases for any E ∈ E and any RS (p,w) with
W+ 6= ∅.
Case 1: b α




p,w for all ν ∈ W+,i ti si m m e d i -
ately seen that Deﬁnition 5 satisﬁes condition (2).
Case 2: b α
p,w ≥ 0 and b α
p,w ≯ 0.( N o t et h a tt h ec a s eb α
p,w = 0 can be ruled
out at any RS with W+ 6= ∅.) First, let this RS (p,w) be associated to πmax =




p,w is available for all ν ∈ W+,s i n c eΓ(p,w;Λν)=∅
as shown in the proof of Theorem 1. Then, it is immediately seen that
Deﬁnition 5 does not meet cν > b α
cν
. Second, let this RS (p,w) be associated




p,w ∈ ∂ b P (αl = Λν) ∩ ∂Rn
+.
Further, noting that τcν =
pcν


















pb αp,w < 1
by πmax > 0, it follows that τcν < Λν
α
p,w





p,w,w h e r e
τcνb α
p,w ∈ ∂ b P (αl = kν) ∩ ∂Rn
+ for some kν < Λν. Then, using the same
argument as in Theorem 1, it can be shown that for each ν ∈ W+,t h e r ei s
14An example similar to those analysed in Appendix 2 below is used in Yoshihara (2010;
Corollary 2) to prove that the Class-Exploitation Correspondence Principle (Roemer, 1982)
does not hold under Deﬁnition 3.
20xν ∈ b P (αl = Λν) ∩ Rn




p,w,a n ds u c h
that xν > τcνb α















l ) > 0, xν ∈ B++ (p,wΛν) f o l l o w sf r o mt h ef a c tt h a txν




p,w and B++ (p,wΛν) is open. Then, let ²ν = 1
be such that ²νxν ∈ ∂ b P (αl = Λν) ∩ Rn
++.L e tcν ≡ ²νxν for each ν ∈ W+.
By construction, cν ∈ Γ(p,w;Λν). Furthermore, since xν > τcνb α
p,w,t h e n
τcνb α
p,w <c ν and since b α
cν
= τcνb α
p,w under Deﬁnition 5, b α
cν
<c ν holds for
each ν ∈ W+.
In summary, condition (2) of Theorem 1 holds for any RS (p,w).
4 Exploitation and Proﬁts: Two extensions
Given the theoretical relevance of PECP in exploitation theory, Theorem 1
and Corollary 1 provide strong support for Deﬁnition 5 as the appropriate
notion of UE exploitation. In this section, two extensions of the analysis are
presented, which provide further support to the ‘New Interpretation’. The
generality of the model is exploited to show that Deﬁnition 5 can be extended
to analyse, ﬁrst, the exploitation status of all agents and the existence of
exploitative relations; and then the correspondence between exploitation and
proﬁts outside of equilibrium allocations, in economies with heterogeneous
preferences and unequal endowments of physical and human capital. This
suggests that, if the ‘New Interpretation’ is adopted, then exploitation theory
can be extended to yield interesting insights on unequal relations between
agents in advanced capitalist economies. As a ﬁrst step, Deﬁnition 5 is
generalised to identify the exploitation status of all agents.
Deﬁnition 6: Consider any economy E ∈ E. Let (p,w) be a RS for E
with aggregate production activity αp,w. For any ν ∈ N, who supplies Λν
and consumes cν ∈ Rn
+ ,l e tτcν be deﬁned as in Deﬁnition 4. Agent ν is:
exploited if and only if Λν > τcνα
p,w
l ;a nexploiter if and only if Λν < τcνα
p,w
l ;
and neither exploited nor an exploiter if and only if Λν = τcνα
p,w
l .
Theorem 2 proves that, based on Deﬁnition 6, it is possible to characterise
the exploitation status of all agents - and not only of the poorest segments
of the working class - and to derive a more general relation between proﬁts
and exploitation beyond the subset of propertyless agents. Recall that Nted
is the set of exploited agents and Nter is the set of exploiters.
21Theorem 2: Consider an economy E ∈ E.L e t(p,w) be a RS for E with
w>0 and associated aggregate production activity αp,w.U n d e r D e ﬁnition
6:


















(2) if πmax > 0, then
n








⊆ Nter.F u r t h e r m o r e ,i f t h e r e
is a subsistence bundle b ∈ Rn
+ such that cν = b, for all ν ∈ N, then n







(3) if πmax =0 , Nted = Nter = ∅.
Proof. 1. Consider the case pb α
p,w > 0.














for all ν ∈ N, and noting that only processes yielding the maximum rate
of proﬁt are going to be activated, the latter expression can be written as
πmaxpων + wΛν = pcν. Then, by Deﬁnition 1-(ii) and Deﬁnition 1-(iv), it
follows that πmaxpω + wα
p,w
l = pb α
p,w.T h e r e f o r e Λν = τcνα
p,w







l , which yields the desired result. The other two
inequalities are proved similarly.
Part (2). Let (p,w) be a RS for E ∈ E.T h eﬁrst part of the statement
follows immediately from part 1, noting that λν 5 1. In order to prove the














for all ν ∈ N, and noting that only processes yielding the maximum rate
of proﬁt are going to be activated, the latter expression can be written as
πmaxpων + wΛν = pcν. Therefore it follows that Λν > τcνα
p,w


















πmaxpων. Then, setting cν = b,f o ra l lν ∈ N, gives the desired result.
Part (3). If πmax =0 , then it follows that wΛν = pcν,f o ra l lν ∈ N,a n d
wα
p,w
l = pb α
p,w, which yields the desired result.
2. Consider the case pb α




holds in the RS, α
p,w
l =0follows from w>0, which together with A1 imply
that αp,w = 0.N o t et h a tt h eR S(p,w) with αp,w = 0 implies that πmax =0 ,
22thus we only examine Part (3). Given α
p,w
l =0 , Λν =0holds for any ν ∈ N.
Thus, Λν = τcνα
p,w
l holds for any ν ∈ N, which implies Nted = Nter = ∅.
Theorem 2-(1) completely characterises the exploitation structure of an
economy in equilibrium: an agent is exploited (respectively, an exploiter) if
and only if her share of social wealth is lower (respectively, higher) than her
share of social labour. Theorem 2-(2) shows that at the two extremes of the
wealth distribution, exploitation status can be determined independently of
individual choices, an intuition of standard Marxist theory that is proved to
be robust. Indeed, if a subsistence bundle exists, the set of agents that are
exploited regardless of their individual choices will be larger than the set of
propertyless agents (those who have ‘nothing to lose but their chains’). This
set can be sizable if b is not interpreted as a physical subsistence bundle,
but rather as reﬂecting moral and social elements. Jointly with Theorem
2-(3), this result proves the correspondence between positive proﬁts and the
exploitation of a larger set of agents than the propertyless segment of the
working class. Actually, given Deﬁnition 6, a very interesting property of the
‘New Interpretation’ immediately derives from Theorems 1 and 2, which can
be stated formally as follows.
Corollary 2: Consider an economy E ∈ E.L e t (p,w) be a RS for E
with associated aggregate production activity αp,w such that W+ 6= ∅.U n d e r
Deﬁnition 6, the following statements are equivalent:
(1) πmax > 0;
(2) W+ ⊆ Nted 6= ∅;
(3) Nter 6= ∅.
Corollary 2 implies that in equilibrium positive proﬁts are a necessary and
suﬃcient condition for the existence of exploitative relations, where the latter
notion can be formalised as requiring that Nted 6= ∅ if and only if Nter 6= ∅.
This seems a weak and obviously reasonable property in exploitation theory:
some agents are exploited if and only if there is someone exploiting them. Yet
Yoshihara and Veneziani (2009) show that none of the main deﬁnitions in the
literature satisfy it in general. As shown by Corollary 2, instead, according
to the ‘New Interpretation’, exploitation has an inherently relational nature.
Further, it captures inequalities between classes of individuals concerning
the allocation of labour. In fact, it is not diﬃcult to prove that, unlike in
other approaches, if some other good is used as the exploitation numéraire
in Deﬁnition 6, neither PECP nor Corollary 2 holds.
23Theorem 2 and Corollary 2 complete the analysis of the relation between
exploitation and proﬁts in equilibrium. They extend the main insights of
UE exploitation theory to all agents in the general economies considered in
this paper, under Deﬁnition 6. This is crucial given the focal theoretical
interest in equilibrium allocations, but one may argue that a robust theory
of exploitation should provide insights also on disequilibrium allocations. In
the rest of this section, an extension of Deﬁnition 5 is proposed, and a general
relation between exploitation and proﬁts is derived, at a n yf e a s i b l ea l l o c a t i o n .
T h ek e yp o i n tt on o t ei st h a tt h e r ea r ev a r i o u sp o s s i b l ew a y so fc o n c e p t u -
alising exploitation at general disequilibrium allocations and, consequently,
there is no trivial way of extending Deﬁnition 5. For example, outside of a
RS, it is unclear whether exploitation status should be determined relative
to the actual features of the allocation. On the one hand, if individual plans
are not realised, coordination failures arise, and perhaps even sheer mistakes
are made, then by focusing on actual data one may be capturing only purely
transient and ephemeral phenomena that do not tell much about the struc-
tural features of the economy. On the other hand, one may insist that, even
outside of an RS, only the information contained in the actual allocation
point is relevant to analyse exploitation. For, ultimately, the actual features
of the allocation are what matters to the agents.
In the extension of Deﬁnition 5 to disequilibrium allocations proposed
here, the actual features of the allocation, including the actual price vector,
the aggregate production activity, and the individual work and consumption
choices of all agents remain central in the deﬁnition of the labour content of
a bundle of commodities and the exploitation status of propertyless agents.
However, the eﬀects of sheer individual mistakes in technical choices, or of
purely temporary market imbalances leading to productive ineﬃciency are
discounted. To be precise, given a price vector (p,w) and an associated
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φ(c;αp,w) denotes the set of production activities which are along the ray
deﬁned by (α
p,w
l , b α
p,w) and produce at least c as net output. Then:
l.v.(c;α
p,w) ≡ min{αl | α =( −αl,−α,α) ∈ φ(c;α
p,w)}.
24Clearly, l.v.(c;αp,w) is well-deﬁned and bounded below by 0. The labour
content of a bundle c at any given allocation can be deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 7: Consider an economy E ∈ E.L e t(p,w) be a price vector for
E with associated aggregate production activity αp,w.F o re a c hc ∈ Rn
+ with
pc 5 pb α
p,w,l e tτc ∈ [0,1] be such that τcb α
p,w ∈ B(p,c).T h elabour embodied
in c at the social reproduction point αp,w is l.v.(τcb α
p,w;αp,w).
The following deﬁnition identiﬁes the set of propertyless workers who are
exploited at any given allocation.
Deﬁnition 8: Consider an economy E ∈ E.L e t(p,w) be a price vector for
E such that αp,w is the associated production point. For any ν ∈ W,w h o
supplies Λν and consumes cν,l e tτcν be deﬁn e da si nD e ﬁnition 7. Then,





From a formal viewpoint, Deﬁnitions 7 and 8 generalise Deﬁnitions 4 and
5 and they reduce to the latter at a RS. In fact, if (p,w) is a RS for E,
then αp,w ∈ ∂P and l.v.(τcb α
p,w;αp,w)=τcα
p,w
l holds. From a theoretical
viewpoint, in Deﬁnitions 7 and 8, the actual allocation of the economy plays
a pivotal role. In order to deﬁne labour content and the exploitation status of
propertyless agents, the actual price vector and the actual individual choices
on work and consumption are central. The only possible deviation from
actual data concerns the focus on technically eﬃcient production activities
in the deﬁnition of labour content, but the set of admissible eﬃcient activities
used in Deﬁnitions 7 and 8 is signiﬁcantly constrained by the actual social
production point αp,w (unlike in Roemer’s or Morishima’s deﬁnitions).
The focus on eﬃcient aggregate production vectors is theoretically rea-
sonable. For technically ineﬃcient activities in the interior of the production
possibility set are the product of transient contingencies and do not reveal
much about the structural features of the economy.15 Moreover, note that,
given the nature of LEW as a domain condition, in section 3 a weak for-
mulation of the axiom is adopted by restricting its application to RS’s. It
is straightforward, however, to extend LEW to all price vectors (p,w) with
associated social production point αp,w and, from a theoretical viewpoint,
none of the arguments used to defend LEW in section 3 depends on the
15Indeed, Marx’s own notion of Socially Necessary Labour Time may be interpreted as
ruling out ineﬃcient technologies and involving a counterfactual analysis. See Sen (1978).
25assumption that the allocation is an equilibrium. Therefore one may argue
that LEW remains an appropriate domain condition to deﬁne UE exploita-
tion even at disequilibrium allocations. From this perspective, it is worth
noting that Deﬁnition 8 satisﬁes LEW,a ta n y(p,w) with associated social
production point αp,w. To see this, let cν ≡ τcν · b α
p,w ∈ B (p,wΛν) and
αcν ≡ argmin{αl | α =( −αl,−α,α) ∈ φ(cν;αp,w)}.
Let CW =
P
ν∈W cν and ΛW =
P
ν∈W Λν. Based on Deﬁnition 8, Theo-
rem 3 establishes a general relation between exploitation and proﬁts for any
general convex cone economies and at any feasible allocations.
Theorem 3: For any economy E ∈ E,a n y(p,w) ∈ R
n+1
+ with w>0 and
any allocation (αν, βν, γν,c ν)ν∈N with pcν = p
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l > 0 holds;










τcν ∈ [0,1) with τcνb α
∗ ∈ B(p,cν).
Proof. Taking a point b α




+.L e tα∗ ∈ ∂P
¡
αl = ΛW¢
be a production point corresponding to b α
∗.
Suppose (1) holds. Then, pb α




> 0, since the bud-
get constraint holds for all agents. Note that, for any ν ∈ W+, pcν = wΛν =
wΛW Λν
ΛW = pCW Λν
ΛW . Then, let τcν =
pcν
pb α∗ for any ν ∈ W+. Clearly τcν ∈ [0,1)
with τcνb α









> 0.F i -








l holds. Thus, (2) is
obtained.










l holds for τcν ∈ [0,1) with τcνb α




l holds. Note that for any ν ∈ W+, wΛν = pcν > 0
by w>0. Then, τcνb α
∗ ∈ B(p,cν) implies τcν > 0 and pb α
∗ > 0.S i n c e
τcν =
pcν
pb α∗ for any ν ∈ W+, ΛW >
P
ν∈W+ τcνα∗







> 0 holds. Since pCW = wΛW = wα∗
l by the budget
constraint, pb α
∗ − wα∗
l > 0 holds.
Theorem 3 states that a general relation between exploitation and proﬁts
holds, at any price vector and corresponding allocation, provided that pro-
26ductive ineﬃciencies and temporary disequilibrium phenomena are ruled out:
at every technically eﬃcient production vector α∗ (which is feasible using ac-
tual, eﬀective labour ΛW =
P
ν∈W Λν) society realises positive proﬁts if and
only if every propertyless worker is exploited. In order to appreciate the full
generality of Theorem 3, it is important to stress that no signiﬁcant restric-
tion is imposed on individual behaviour (except that the budget constraint
holds for all agents) and on the actual allocation. As a result, Theorem 3 does
not establish necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the existence of positive
proﬁts and the exploitation of propertyless workers at the actual allocation,
and the social production point αp,w may, or may not, coincide with one of
the vectors α∗. For given the extremely weak restrictions on the set of admis-
sible allocations, the link between proﬁts and exploitation may be somewhat
weakened. For instance, if ΛW
αl+βl
³














hold at the actual allocation, then
the corresponding proﬁt rate may be non-positive while propertyless agents
are exploited. However, Theorem 3 derives the general conditions under
which the economy can generate positive proﬁts and propertyless workers are
exploited, starting from the actual individual consumption/leisure choices,
price system, and aggregate production actitivity. In other words, if one ab-
stracts from temporary disequilibrium phenomena, Theorem 3 does derive a
fully general relation between the appropriation of surplus by capitalists and
the exploitation of (propertyless) workers, which holds even if exchanges do
not take place at equilibrium prices.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper provides a novel axiomatic analysis of the notion of exploitation
as the unequal exchange of labour. General convex economies with agents
endowed with heterogeneous preferences and with diﬀerent amounts of phys-
ical and human capital are considered. A deﬁnition of exploitation related to
the ‘New Interpretation’ is analysed, which emphasises the relational nature
of exploitation and the inequalities in the allocation of labour. An axiomatic
characterisation of the class of deﬁnitions that preserve two weak axioms -
a domain condition called Labour Exploitation of the Working Class and
the Proﬁt-Exploitation Correspondence Principle - is derived (Theorem 1).
Based on this characterisation, it is shown that none of the main received
27deﬁnitions preserves the link between the appropriation of surplus and the
exploitation of (at least some) workers, except for the ‘New Interpretation’.
The latter deﬁnition also allows one to generalise some key insights of ex-
ploitation theory in complex convex economies with heterogeneous agents: it
is possible to characterise the exploitation status of all agents in equilibrium
(Theorem 2) and to derive a general relation between exploitation and proﬁts
even outside of equilibrium allocations (Theorem 3).
Given the relevance of the PECP in exploitation theory, the results pre-
sented in this paper provide strong support to the ‘New Interpretation’ as the
appropriate notion of exploitation in advanced capitalist economies. Thus,
they complement and strengthen the analysis developed by Yoshihara and
Veneziani (2009) in the context of convex subsistence economies. In fact,
as mentioned in section 2 above, the main results of the paper could be de-
rived by assuming the function uν to be weakly monotone on C × [0,1] and
strictly monotone in at least one argument, provided some additional tech-
nical conditions to ensure local nonsatiation are added.16 This assumption
encompasses the special case where there is a subsistence bundle b ∈ Rn
+
such that C ≡
©
c ∈ Rn
+ | c = b
ª
,a n duν(c,λ)=1− λ,f o ra l lν and for any
(c,λ) ∈ C × [0,1].I f u is given by a proﬁle of functions of the latter type
and s =( 1 ,...,1),t h e nE(P,N,u,s,Ω) is a subsistence economy of the type
analysed by Roemer (1982) and Yoshihara and Veneziani (2009). But then,
it is possible to conclude that the ‘New Interpretation’ provides the unique
appropriate deﬁnition of exploitation because, as shown above, it preserves
PECP in general, and, as shown by Yoshihara and Veneziani (2009), it is
fully characterised by a small set of weak and intuitive axioms in the set
of subsistence economies which is a subset of the general class of economies
considered in this paper. Moreover, the set of axioms is satisﬁed by the ‘New
Interpretation’ deﬁnition of exploitation even in the general class of convex
economies discussed in this paper.
The results presented above, however, raise some interesting questions.
First of all, the paper focuses on economies with heterogenous human cap-
ital, or skills, in which only one type of homogenous labour is required in
production, but one may argue that a general model of heterogeneous labour
should also allow for the possibility diﬀerent types of labour inputs in the
16For example, if agents minimise labour over [0,1], subject to a subsistence constraint,
then something like Roemer’s (1982) ‘Non Benevolent Capitalists’ assumption should be
made. For a thorough discussion, see Yoshihara and Veneziani (2009).
28production set P. This represents an interesting direction for further research
and it raises interesting issues concerning the existence of a RS. However, all
of the key results on exploitation theory proved in this paper should continue
to hold provided each agent’s eﬀective labour contribution per unit of time is






which supports a RS, there is a proﬁle
of individual wage rates w =( wν)ν∈N at this RS, and a common wage rate
w>0 and sν (αp,w) > 0 for each ν ∈ N such that wsν (αp,w)=wν,t h a t
is the marginal rate of productivity of his individual labour. Given this for-
mulation, all the key analytical results of this paper on exploitation should
hold.
Second, Theorem 2-(2) conﬁrms the standard Marxist analysis of ex-
ploitation at the two ends of the wealth distribution: propertyless agents are
exploited and the very wealthy are exploiters. Yet, outside of the two ex-
tremes, the exploitation status of an agent is in general determined not only
by her endowment of physical capital, but also by her choice of consump-
tion and leisure, as well as her endowment of human capital - namely, her
skills. This raises some interesting issues for exploitation theory, in particu-
l a rf r o man o r m a t i v ev i e w p o i n t :e x c e p tf o rt h ea g e n t sa tt h et w oe x t r e m e s
of the distribution of productive assets, it may well be the case that agents
with nonnegligible amounts of physical assets, who do not work much appear
as exploited because they have a large endowment of human capital, which
increases their overall labour contribution to the economy.
Third, this paper focuses on exploitation, and on the key relation between
proﬁts and exploitation. Another interesting issue concerns the relation be-
tween class and exploitation: Roemer (1982), for example, maintains that
the correspondence between class and exploitation status is a core tenet of
Marxian exploitation theory. Deﬁnition 6 above provides interesting results
on this issue, too. For example, Yoshihara and Veneziani (2009) and Yoshi-
hara (2010) prove that, unlike in the standard approaches, if the New Inter-
pretation is adopted, it is possible to derive the full class and exploitation
structure, and a robust correspondence between class and exploitation sta-
tus in convex economies with agents endowed with identical preferences and
skills. To extend the latter results to general economies with heterogeneous
agents is an interesting direction for further research.
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7 Appendix 1: The existence of a RS
This appendix proves the existence of an equilibrium for a theoretically rel-
evant subset of the set of economies E. It focuses on the polar case where
C = Rn
+ and it generalises the proofs of existence in Roemer (1980, 1982).
Yoshihara and Veneziani (2009) prove the existence of a RS for another polar
case where C =
©
c ∈ Rn
+ | c = b
ª
for some subsistence vector b ∈ Rn
+\{0},
uν is not strictly increasing on C, and agents minimise labour.
It is assumed that uν is continuous, quasi-concave, and strictly increasing
on C for all ν ∈ N. Further, the following standard boundary condition
of utility functions is assumed: uν (c,λ) >u ν (0,λ0) for any c ∈ Rn
+\{0},
and any λ,λ0 ∈ [0,1]. This assumption implies that any propertyless agent
ν ∈ W would rather participate in labour markets to earn some revenue
and purchase some consumption goods, than drop out of labour markets
consuming nothing. Finally, A1 is slightly strengthened to require that some
produced inputs be used in the production of commodities:
Assumption 10 (A10). For all α ∈ P, α ≥ 0 ⇒ [αl > 0 and α ≥ 0].
A10 is an essential property of a capitalist economy in the sense that if it is
not satisﬁed, anyone - including propertyless agents - can in principle hire
32workers. Given the twin role of agents as consumers and producers, A10 also
allows us to prove the boundedness of the aggregate demand correspondences.
Let a proﬁle (cν,γν,βν)ν∈N be a feasible allocation for E ∈ E if and only if
(cν,γν,βν)ν∈N satisﬁes Deﬁnition 1-(ii), 1-(iii), and 1-(iv), and (cν,γν,βν) ∈
C×[0,s ν]×P holds for all ν ∈ N. If the social endowment of capital ω of an
economy E ∈ E only allows for feasible allocations with
P
ν∈N cν = 0,t h e ni f
a RS exists for this economy, it can only be a trivial RS. However, by A2,i t
is always possible to have a non-trivial feasible allocation with
P
ν∈N cν 6= 0
if ω is placed appropriately. Thus, in order to guarantee the existence of
non-trivial feasible allocations, the following assumption is made:









ν and b α ≥ 0
)
.
By A4, there exists α0 ∈ P with α0
l 5
P
ν∈N sν and α0 = ω such that for any
p>0, p(α0 − ω) > 0. Thus, for a suﬃciently small w0 > 0, p(α0 − ω)−wα0
l =
0 holds for any w 5 w0.T h i si m p l i e st h a tf o ra n yp>0,t h e r ei sw0 > 0 such
that for any w 5 w0, maxα∈P: pα=pω pb α − wαl is non-negative.









agent ν0s net revenue. Note that, for any (p,w), if the set of optimal solutions
Oν (p,w), then it always contains vectors of the form (0, βν, γν,c ν) such
that Πν (p,w)=πmaxpβ
ν + wγν = pcν with pβ







i=1 pi + w =1
ª
and M+≡ {(p,w) ∈M| p>0}.
In order to analyse the existence of a RS, for all (p,w) ∈M+,a n df o ra l l














The next result establishes some basic properties of Bν(p,w).
Lemma A1.1: For each ν ∈ N, the correspondence Bν is non-empty,
closed-valued and convex-valued, and continuous on M+. Moreover, every
(cν,γν) in Bν(p,w) is bounded for each (p,w) ∈M+.
Proof. It is obvious that Bν is non-empty, closed-valued, and convex-valued.
Since pcν 5 Πν (p,w) 5 πmaxpων + wsν, the boundedness of (cν,γν) in
Bν(p,w) follows from A10, for all (p,w) ∈M+.





































































kν 5 pkων, and since μkν =0for pkb β
ν
− wkβν
l + wkγν 5
0, Πν ¡
pk,w k¢
= 0 holds. Therefore,
¡
ckν,βkν,γkν¢





→ (p,w). The last convergence















,l e tγkν = γν, ckν = 0,a n dβkν ≡ μkνβν where if βν = 0





































+ wkγν < 0.
Then, since μkν 5
pkων
pkβν , pkβ
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→ (p,w).T h el a s t




T h ep r e v i o u sa r g u m e n t ss h o wt h a tBν is lower hemi-continuous.

















→ (p,w),a n d(cν,βν,γν) / ∈
Bν(p,w). Then, either (cν,βν,γν) / ∈ C × P × [0,s ν],o rpcν > Πν (p,w),
or pβ




34implies that (cν,βν,γν) ∈ C × P × [0,s ν]. Thus, either pcν > Πν (p,w) or
pβ
ν >p ων.S u p p o s e pβ







is also suﬃciently close to (cν,βν,γν),
which implies pkβ
kν >p kων, which yields a contradiction. This implies that
(cν,βν,γν) ∈ Bν(p,w). A similar argument holds if pcν > Πν (p,w) and
therefore Bν is upper hemi-continuous.
Lemma A1.2 analyses optimal choice correspondences.
Lemma A1.2: For each ν, the correspondence Oν is non-empty, closed-
valued, convex-valued, and upper hemi-continuous on M+. Moreover, every
(cν,γν) in Oν(p,w) is bounded for each (p,w) ∈M+.
Proof. Non-emptiness, closed-valuedness, and convexity can be proved in
the standard manner. Since every (cν,γν) in Bν(p,w) is bounded by Lemma
A1.1, every (cν,γν) in Oν(p,w) is bounded for any (p,w) ∈M+.

















→ (p,w). Suppose (cν,βν,γν) / ∈
Oν(p,w).T h i si m p l i e st h a t(cν,γν) is not a maximizer of uν over Bν(p,w)
and (cν,βν,γν) ∈ Bν(p,w) by the upper hemi-continuity of Bν. Then, there
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Oν(pk,w k), this is a contradiction. Thus, (cν,βν,γν) ∈ Oν(p,w),a n ds oOν
is upper hemi-continuous.
For any ν ∈ N,i f(p,w) ∈M+ is associated with pb α − wαl < 0 for all
α ∈ P\{0},t h e n(cν,βν,γν) ∈ Oν(p,w) implies βν = 0.H o w e v e r ,b y A 4 ,
for any p>0,t h e r ei sw0 > 0 such that for any w 5 w0, maxα∈P: pα=pω pb α −
wαl is non-negative, so that there is (cν,βν,γν)ν∈N ∈ ×ν∈NOν(p,w) with P
ν∈N βν 6= 0.
For each (p,w) ∈M+,l e tP(p,w;ω) ≡
©






l ≡ max(p0,w0)∈M min{αl | α ∈ P(p0,w 0;ω)}. Then, let P∗(p,w;ω) ≡ ©






for each (p,w) ∈M+.B y t h i s
35deﬁnition, P∗(p,w;ω) is non-empty, convex, compact, and upper hemi-continuous
at every (p,w) ∈M+.
































ν(p,w)( ∀ν ∈ N)}.
Given the above Lemmas and the deﬁnition of P∗(p,w;ω), it follows that Z
is compact-valued, convex-valued, and upper hemi-continuous on M+. To see
that it is non-empty, ﬁrstly suppose that (p,w) ∈M+ is such that pb α−wαl < 0
for all α ∈ P\{0}. Then, P(p,w;ω)={0} = P∗(p,w;ω), so that there
exists (βν)ν∈N such that βν = 0 for all ν.N e x t ,i fpb α − wαl = 0 for some
α ∈ P\{0}, P(p,w;ω) ⊇
©





so that P∗(p,w;ω)\{0} 6= ∅,a n ds oi fα ∈ P∗(p,w;ω)\{0} then there is
(βν)ν∈N such that
P
ν∈N βν = α,a n dpβ
ν = pων for all ν.I ne i t h e rc a s e ,f o r
(cν,γν) in Oν(p,w), it follows that (cν,βν,γν) ∈ Oν(p,w) for each ν ∈ N.
By deﬁnition, since
P
ν∈N βν ∈ P∗(p,w;ω), Z (p,w) is non-empty. Then:
Lemma A1.3: T h e r ee x i s t sap r i c ev e c t o r(p,w) ∈M+ such that 0 ∈ Z (p,w).
Proof. 1. First, we prove that Z satisﬁes the Strong Walras Law (SWL),
namely for each (p,w) ∈M+,a n de a c h(z1,z 2) ∈ Z (p,w), pz1 + wz2 =0 .I n
fact, for each (p,w) ∈M+,a n de a c h(z1,z 2) ∈ Z (p,w),















































+ wγν for every ν, by the strict motonicity of uν.
2. Next, we prove that Z satisﬁes the following Boundary condition:





→ (p,w) ∈M \ M+,t h e r ei sa nM such that for every k = M,















.T a k eas u ﬃciently
small but positive real number ε,a n dd e ﬁne (e p, e w) ∈M+ as e w = ε > 0,a n d
for all j, e pj = 1−ε
n > 0. Then, consider any price vector (p,w) ∈M \ M+,




is possible that wk =0for suﬃciently large k. Thus, in this case, ckν = 0
for any ν ∈ W. However, in this case, the corresponding πmaxk is strictly
positive by A4,a n ds oΠν ¡
pk,w k¢
> 0 for any ν ∈ N\W. Hence, by the
strict monotonicity of utility functions, ckν ≥ 0 for any ν ∈ N\W,a n di n
particular, ckν
i is suﬃciently large at pk for suﬃciently large k. Secondly, ©¡
pk,w k¢ª
⊆M+ may also contain the case that wk > 0 but πmaxk is zero
for suﬃciently large k. In this case, because of the boundary condition for
utility functions, any ν ∈ N optimally supplies a positive amount of labour,
so that Πν ¡
pk,w k¢
> 0. Thus, by the strict monotonicity of utility functions,
ckν ≥ 0 for any ν ∈ N, and in particular, ckν
i is suﬃciently large at pk for
suﬃciently large k. In sum, noting that βk ∈ P∗(pk,w k;ω) is bounded above,
it follows that zk
1i > 0 is suﬃciently large for pk suﬃciently close to p. Then,
even if e w>0, e wzk
2 will never compensate for e pzk




ν∈N sν whereas e pzk
1 grows inﬁnitely large due to a suﬃciently
large zk
1i > 0. Thus, there is a neighbourhood N ((p,w),δ) of (p,w) such






> 0 for all
¡
pk,w k¢
∈ N ((p,w),δ)∩ M+. A similar
argument holds if (p,w) ∈M \ M+,w i t hpi =0 , for more than one i.
3. Set Km ≡ co
©
(q,w) ∈M+| dist((q,w),M \ M+) = 1
m
ª
. Then, {Km} is
an increasing family of compact convex sets and M+= ∪mKm. Then, as in
Border (1985, Theorem 18.13, p. 85), it follows that there exist (p,w) ∈M+
and z ∈ Z (p,w) such that z 5 0. This fact together with (SWL) imply that
z = 0.I nf a c t ,s i n c ep>0,( S W L )a n dz 5 0 imply that z1 = 0. Second, if






ν∈N γ∗ν < 0. Given that every agent’s utility function
uν is strictly monotonic on C, the real-valued function V ν (Πν (p,w),γν) ≡
max(cν,βν,γν)∈Bν(p,w) uν (cν,γν) is strictly monotonic on Πν (p,w),f o ra l lν.
Since Πν (p,w)=πmaxpβ
∗ν+wγ∗ν = πmaxpβ
∗ν,t h e nV ν (Πν (p,w),γ∗ν)=
V ν (Πν (p,w),0) because uν is (weakly) decreasing in γν on [0,1].T h u s ,
whenever (c∗ν,β∗ν,γ∗ν) ∈ Oν(p,w) for all ν ∈ N, then for any γ∗∗ν ∈ [0,γ∗ν],






l , (c∗ν,β∗ν,γ∗∗ν) ∈ Oν(p,w) holds






ν∈N γ∗∗ν =0 .T h e n , (z1,z0
2) ∈
Z (p,w), which yields the desired result.
Lemma A1.3 proves the existence of a ﬁxed point for the aggregate excess
demand correspondences: there exists a price vector (p,w) ∈M+ such that
conditions (i), (ii) and (iv) of Deﬁnition 1 are satisﬁed. In order to complete
37the proof of existence of a RS, it is necessary to show that condition (iii) also
holds. Theorem A1.1 provides a condition on aggregate social endowments
under which the capital constraint (iii) is satisﬁed.
Theorem A1.1: Let A10 ∼A3 hold and let uν be continuous, quasi-concave,
strictly increasing on C , and satisfying the boundary condition for all ν ∈
N.F o r a n y p r o ﬁle Ω =( ων)ν∈N with
P
ν∈N ων = ω ≥ 0 which satisﬁes
A4, there exist a distribution Ω0 =( ω0ν)ν∈N with
P
ν∈N ω0ν = ω0 and a RS
(p,w) ∈M+ for the economy E(P,N,u,s,Ω0) with pω0ν = pων for all ν ∈ N.
Proof. Let P,N,s,a n dΩ =( ων)ν∈N satisfy A10 ∼A4,a n dl e tu be
such that for all ν ∈ N, uν is continuous, quasi-concave, strictly increas-
ing on C ,a n di ts a t i s ﬁes the boundary condition. Then, we can ap-












Thus, (p∗,w ∗) is associated with p∗b α − w∗αl = 0 for some α ∈ P\{0}.
In fact, if (p∗,w ∗) is such that p∗b α − w∗αl < 0 for all α ∈ P\{0},t h e n
β∗ν = 0 for all ν ∈ N,b u tγ∗ν > 0 and c∗ν 6= 0 follow from w∗ > 0 and
the boundary condition for utility functions. (Note that if p∗b α − w∗αl < 0












< 0 follow if p∗b α − w∗αl < 0 for all α ∈ P\{0},
which is a contradiction. Thus, p∗b α − w∗αl = 0 for some α ∈ P\{0}.
Since p∗b α − w∗αl = 0 for some α ∈ P\{0}, (0,β∗ν,γ∗ν,c ∗ν)ν∈N is a
proﬁle of optimal solutions of all MPν with p∗β
∗ν = p∗ων for all ν ∈ N,t h u s
p∗β
∗ = p∗ω at (p∗,w ∗).B yA4, the existence of such proﬁle is guaranteed.
Let us deﬁne Ω0 =( ω0ν)ν∈N as ω0ν = β
∗ν for each ν ∈ N. Then, since
p∗ω0ν = p∗ων holds for each ν ∈ N, it follows that (0,β∗ν,γ∗ν,c ∗ν)ν∈N re-













=0 .M o r e o v e r β
∗ = ω0, and therefore
condition (iii) of Deﬁnition 1 is also satisﬁed. Hence, for the economy
E(P,N,u,s,Ω0), (p∗,w ∗) is a RS with associated proﬁle (0,β∗ν,γ∗ν,c ∗ν)ν∈N.
Note that the existence of a RS requires an appropriate position of the
initial endowment vector, ω, as shown in Roemer (1980; Appendix II) and
Yoshihara (2010). This is because a RS is a kind of one-shot slice of a
stationary-state dynamic competitive equilibrium, which may be infeasible
38under an arbitrary position of the initial endowment vector. Theorem A1.1
does not provide the necessary and suﬃcient characterisation for a suitable
position of the endowment vector, since this paper considers an economy
with heterogeneous preferences, in which the balanced growth path cannot
be identiﬁed by the sole information of the production possibility set, unlike
Roemer (1980; Proposition 1.1) and Yoshihara (2010; Proposition 1). How-
ever, the theorem shows that even starting from any arbitrary position of the
initial endowment vector, there exists an equilibrium price vector such that
the economy can ‘purchase’ a suitable endowment vector with that prices,
under which the above mentioned stationary-state is feasible.
8 Appendix 2: Deﬁnitions 2 and 3
Lemma A2.1: There exists an economy E ∈ E and a RS (p,w) with as-
sociated aggregate production point αp,w such that neither Deﬁnition 2 nor
Deﬁnition 3 satisﬁes condition (2) of Theorem 1.
















where A is the input matrix; B is the output matrix; and L is the vector of




5 | ∃x ∈ R
3
+ : α 5 (−Lx,−Ax,Bx)
ª
.
P(A,B,L) is a closed convex cone in R5 with 0 ∈ P(A,B,L) and it satisﬁes
A1∼A3. Let ej ∈ R3
+ be a unit column vector with 1 in the j-th com-
ponent and 0 in any other component. Let α1 ≡ (−Le1,−Ae1,Be1), α2 ≡
(−Le2,−Ae2,Be2),a n dα3 ≡ (−Le3,−Ae3,Be3).T h e n ,
b α



















Also, we have b P (αl =1 )=co{(1,0),(1,1.5),(0,1.75),0}.
39Let W 6= ∅ and let N be such that |N| > |W|.L e t c∗ =( 1 ,1) and
let the social endowment of capital be given by ω =( 2 |N|,3|N|).L e t








for all ν ∈ N\W,s ot h a t
P
ν∈N ων = ω.T h i s




. Then, a pair (p,1)





a social production point |N|α2.T os e et h i s ,n o t eﬁrst that


























,a n dλν =1is
an optimal solution to MPν. Further, for every ν ∈ W, (cν,λν)=( c∗,1)
is an optimal solution to MPν,s ot h a ta tt h i sR S ,W+ = W. Then, it is
immediate to check that conditions (ii)-(iv) of Deﬁnition 1 are all satisﬁed.
Since cν = c∗,t h e ni nb o t hD e ﬁnition 2 and Deﬁnition 3, cν = c∗ and
b α
cν
= c∗ hold for every ν ∈ W. Then it is immediate to show that for all








such that cν > (1,1) =
b α
cν
even though πmax = 1
10 > 0, which implies that in this economy, neither
Deﬁnition 2 nor Deﬁnition 3 satisﬁes condition (2) of Theorem 1.17
17The constructed economy in this proof does not satisfy ‘independence of production,’
which was introduced by Roemer (1980) as the necessary and suﬃcient condition for
preserving FMT under Deﬁnition 2 in convex cone economies with homogeneous agents.
Note, however, that in convex cone economies with heterogeneous agents, independence
of production is no longer necessary nor suﬃcient, since it is easy to ﬁnd an economy
and a RS with heterogenous consumption bundles (cν)ν∈W among propertyless workers,
in which the production set satisﬁes independence of production while condition (2) of
Theorem 1 does not hold for some propertyless worker.
In contrast, FMT does not hold in general under Deﬁnition 3 even if the production set
satisﬁes independence of production and the economy has homogeneous agents. This can
be seen by Yoshihara and Veneziani (2011a; Theorem 1).
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